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Abstract 
Among available policy levers to boost innovation, investment in applied research organisations has 
received little empirical attention. In this paper, we analyse the case of the Fraunhofer Society, the largest 
public applied research organization in Germany. We analyse whether project interaction with 
Fraunhofer affects the performance and strategic orientation of firms. To that end, we assemble a unique 
dataset based on the confidential Fraunhofer-internal project management system and merge it with the 
German contribution to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), which contains panel information on 
firm performance. Using instrumental variables that exploit the scale heteroscedasticity of the 
independent variable (Lewbel, 2012), we identify the causal effects of Fraunhofer interactions on firm 
performance and strategies. We find a strong, positive effect of project interaction on growth in turnover 
and productivity. In particular, we find that a one percent increase in the size of the contracts with FhG 
leads to an increase in growth rate of sales by 1.3 percentage points, and to an increase in the growth 
rate of productivity by 0.8 percentage points in the short-run. We also provide evidence of considerable 
long-run effects accumulating to 18% growth in sales and 12% growth in productivity over the course 
of 15 years. More detailed analyses reveal, amongst others, that the performance effects become stronger 
the more often firms interact with Fraunhofer and that interactions aiming at generation of technology 
have a stronger effect than interactions aiming merely at the implementation of existing technologies. 
Finally, we provide evidence on the macroeconomic productivity effects of Fraunhofer interactions on 
the German economy. Our results indicate that doubling Fraunhofer revenues from industry (+€ 0.68 
bn.) would increase overall productivity in the German economy by 0.55%. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Innovation is the key driver of sustained economic growth in advanced countries. Given its importance, 
policies that foster and increase the effectiveness of innovation activities should be a top priority for 
governments. Yet, in reality, only a small fraction of the human and financial resources of governments 
are devoted to innovation policy. One reason for the relatively small efforts devoted to the design of 
innovation policies by governments may be the limited knowledge we have about the foundations and 
effects of innovation policies. 
Researchers that study the effects of specific innovation policies have confronted two key issues. The 
first issue is to find a source of exogenous variation in the treatment provided by the government. 
Coming up with a valid identification strategy is particularly challenging in this context because 
companies can typically self-select into the treatment. The second issue is the difficulty to assemble 
datasets that contain measures of the policy treatment received by companies and the company-level 
outcome that we are interested in. The severity of these challenges may explain why much of the existing 
work in the literature focuses on treatments that are economy-wide and outcomes that are covered in 
pre-existing company-level datasets. For example, the majority of the empirical work has focused on 
the effect of financial incentives and intellectual property (IP) protection on private R&D expenditures 
and patenting activity.1 In contrast, we know much less about the foundations and actual impact of other 
policy levers such as, for example, having the public sector directly involved in the innovation process 
rather than just its financing or regulation. Similarly, there are relatively few studies that have shed light 
on the impact of innovation policies on other variables such as productivity, employment and sales 
growth or relevant dimensions of the company’ strategy such as its human resource or product 
commercialization decisions.   
This paper differs from much of the innovation policy literature along several dimensions. The first 
difference is that the policies we study do not affect the financial cost of innovating for the treated 
companies, or the protection of the intellectual property rights of their innovations. Instead, the aim of 
the policies is to facilitate the access to key inputs in the innovation process for which markets may be 
imperfect or altogether missing. The second difference is that the goal of the innovation policies we 
focus on is not the development of new patents. More specifically, the institutions we study intend to 
solve specific technological problems faced by individual companies. The solutions to these problems 
sometimes may require the invention of a new technology, but in most cases it just involves applying 
                                                          
1 Papers that estimate the effects of fiscal incentives on private R&D spending and or patenting include Berger 
(1993), Hall (1993), Bloom et al. (2002), Bronzini and Piselli (2016), Cappelen et al. (2012), Knoll et al. (2014), 
Cowling (2016), Dechezleprêtre et al. (2016), Montmartin and Herrera (2015), Castellacci and Lie (2015), 
Guceri and Liu (2017), Rao (2016), Cerulli and Poti (2012), and Czarnitzki et al. (2011).  Papers that study the 
effect of IP protection on innovation include Murray and Stern (2007), Williams (2013), Sampat and Williams 
(2019), Galasso and Schankerman (2014), Galasso and Schankerman (2018). 
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existing technological knowledge to the specific circumstances of the company. This observation 
highlights a third difference of our study with the bulk of the innovation literature. Namely, that the 
policies and institutions we study may impact welfare not only by fostering innovation but, possibly 
more importantly, by facilitating the diffusion of technological knowledge from those that have it to 
those that need it. These three differences suggest that our analysis has the potential to shed light on 
policies, channels and aspects of the innovation process that differ markedly from those studied in the 
literature. 
To be precise, we study the effects for a German company of engaging in a research contract with the 
Fraunhofer society on the companies’ performance and strategy. The Fraunhofer society (FhG) is a 
public applied research organization established after WWII and that currently employs over 24,000 
people, most of them scientists from engineering and natural sciences, to work on R&D projects. It 
produces around 500 patents per year and launches around 10 start-ups. However, the key activity of 
FhG we study is the approximately 8000 research contracts that FhG signs per year with German 
companies. The scope of research contracts varies greatly but, in general, they intend to provide some 
technological service to the company that typically cannot be obtained in the market. These services 
allow the companies to improve on their production processes, products or services. In general, the 
contracts aim at making the companies more innovative, though research contracts do not necessarily 
increase the technological frontier in Germany. 
To investigate the effects of research contracts on company performance it is necessary to assemble a 
firm-level data set that contains information on the contracts and on the firm performance. The first 
contribution of this paper consists in constructing such a dataset. For the first time in history, we have 
gained access to the population of confidential FhG research contracts. For each of the 130,000 contracts 
signed between 1997 and 2013, we have information on the companies involved, the duration, payments, 
the research institutes that participated and a short description of the tasks it involved. We have merged 
these data with the German contribution to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), which contains 
information on the performance and innovation activities of a large panel of companies in Germany. 
After merging these two datasets, we have assembled a panel that covers a representative sample of 
German companies and that contains information of over 109,000 contracts signed by 3.4% of the 
companies in the Community Innovation Survey.  
A key challenge to identifying the causal effect of FhG on firm performance is that firms may self-select 
into contracting with FhG. If firms that are more able are more likely to engage with FhG, standard 
econometric techniques may result in biased estimates of the effect of research contracts on company’s 
performance. To deal with the potential endogeneity of the firms’ interactions with FhG, we follow a 
long tradition in applied econometrics that has taken advantage of the presence of heteroscedasticity in 
the selection equation. King et al. (1994), Sentana and Fiorentini (2001), Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon 
and Sack (2004), for example, have used heteroscedasticity over time as a source of exogenous variation. 
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Building on insights from Wright (1928), Lewbel (2012) has recently shown how to generate valid 
instrumental variables also in the presence of purely cross-sectional scale-heteroscedasticity.   
Like in the case of standard IV-methods, for Lewbel-instruments to be valid they must be relevant and 
exogenous. The relevance requirement is met, if there is scale-heteroscedasticity in the treatment. In our 
data, we uncover strong (positive) scale-heteroscedasticity of the FhG treatment both with respect to the 
size of the firm and its own lagged value. The exogeneity assumption is equivalent to the standard 
requirement that the instruments and the second stage-error term are uncorrelated. A sufficient condition 
is the standard assumption of homoscedasticity in the unobserved variable. In the standard unobserved 
variable model, this assumption is usually implied. However, in overidentified models, this exogeneity 
assumption can be tested empirically as well. Our test results indicate that the Lewbel instruments also 
meet the exogeneity assumption. Additionally, we test the validity of the instrumentation strategy by 
conducting a placebo test by which we estimate the (instrumented) effect of future expenditures on 
research contracts on lagged firm performance measures. The estimated coefficient is small and 
insignificant. 
In a first step we implement purely static models, which take into account only short-term effects of 
Fraunhofer interactions on firm performance. The static models show significant and positive effects on 
firm growth, productivity, the share of turnover due to new products, and the share of employees with 
tertiary education. Based on the static models, we investigate whether the impact varies along different 
observable characteristics of the companies, and research projects. We find significant heterogeneity in 
the effects of research contracts. For example, we estimate a greater effect on (i) the growth of sales and 
the share of sales from new products in younger firms; (ii) the impact tends to be larger and more 
significant on medium and (especially) large companies; and (iii) we find stronger effects on companies 
that already engage in some R&D expenditures but those tend to be larger if the expenditures are below 
the sample average. We also estimate significant heterogeneity in the effects based on project 
characteristics. Projects that involve the generation of technologies tend to have greater effect on firm 
sales and on the share of college educated workers than those that involve technology implementation. 
Larger projects tend to have greater effects on sales growth but not necessarily on the composition of 
the labour force and on the share of sales from innovative products and services. Finally, we document 
that the effect of research contracts is higher when the company has previously interacted with FhG.  
The observation that Fraunhofer expenditures are strongly autocorrelated, however, suggests that there 
are long-term effects on Fraunhofer performance. In order to estimate the long-run effects, we therefore 
devise dynamic models, which control for the autocorrelation in the Fraunhofer expenditures in a first 
step. Indeed, controlling for dynamics seems essential as indicated by a series of placebo-tests. The 
results on the dynamic models in particular show that only the effects on firm growth and productivity 
remain significant. Specifically, we find that a one percent increase in the size of the contracts with FhG 
leads to an increase in growth rate of sales by 1.3 percentage points, and to an increase in the growth 
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rate of productivity by 0.8 percentage points. These effects are economically significant, and amount, 
respectively, to 21% and 11% of the average growth rates observed for turnover and productivity in our 
sample. Furthermore, autocorrelation structure of the Fraunhofer expenditures allows estimating the 
long-run effects on firm performance by analysing how the effects of a shock to Fraunhofer expenditures 
propagate over time. We find that entering into a research contract of the median size (€ 22,762), induces 
cumulative growth over the next fifteen years of 18% in company sales and 12% in productivity.  
We conclude our analysis by calculating the aggregate effects of FhG research contracts on German 
productivity. Basing our results on our dynamic models, the figures suggest a doubling of FhG revenues 
from industry in total would increase the productivity in the total German economy by 0.55%. FhG's 
productivity leverage with respect to the German economy is therefore considerable given that a 
hypothetical doubling of industry revenues corresponds only to an additional amount of € 0.68 bn. p.a. 
Related literature 
In addition to the papers cited above, our work is related to another important strand in the literature 
dealing with the econometric analysis of the university-industry interactions on firm performance. The 
analyses in this field have to a large extent focused on the role of universities as providers of basic 
knowledge (Lööf & Broström 2008, Maietta 2015, Robin and Schubert 2013). However, basic 
knowledge may often be too distant from the market and very difficult for the firms to absorb (Toole et 
al. 2014). That is why a number of countries have established (partly) publicly funded applied research 
organizations, whose goal is to help firms to integrate complex scientific knowledge into their 
innovation processes. Among these countries are Germany with the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, Sweden 
with the RISE institutes, and the Netherlands with TNO. Yet, despite the great importance for the local 
research landscape, to date little research is available focusing on extra-university public research 
organizations explicitly. One exception is Giannapolou et al. (2019) who analyse inasmuch firms 
cooperating with universities and firms cooperating with extra-university public research organizations 
differ. Because of data limitations, it is however questionable whether the observed differences may be 
interpreted as causal effects. Identifying causal effects is at the centre of our interest in this paper.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature, presents a brief 
description of the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft and introduces the datasets used in the analysis. Section 3 
presents the identification strategy. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Institutional and data preliminaries 
2.1 What is Fraunhofer? 
The Fraunhofer Gesellschaft is a public non-profit organization focused on the advancement of applied 
research. Founded in 1949 with the strategic intent of fostering the rebuild of the German industrial 
sector after WWII, it fosters to bridge the gap between basic research and industrial applications. It took 
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a while for FhG to reach its current size. In 1959, it consisted of 9 institutes with a budget of less than € 
10 m. in today’s value. Only in 1965, the Research Council (a semi-public advisory organization) 
proposed extending extra-university research. Following the advice of the Research Council, the 
German parliament officially accepted the so-called “Fraunhofer-model” forming the bases of the still 
continuing growth of the Fraunhofer Society in 1973.  
Today, FhG is the biggest non-profit organization for applied sciences in the world, with a budget of € 
2.1bn. FhG is organized as a private registered association (“eingetragener Verein, e.V.”) and receives 
public funding amounting to roughly 25% of its total budget (90% from the federal government and 
10% from regional government where the respective institute is located). The Fraunhofer Society 
comprises 72 research institutes located all over Germany. The institutes focus on different topics mostly 
in the field of engineering and natural sciences, though a few institutes exist which are more related to 
social sciences and economics. 
FhG's mission makes it the natural organization to study the magnitude of scientific knowledge transfer 
to private firms. Of the total budget of € 2.1bn. in 2016 almost 30% came from industry funds, which is 
by far the largest share compared to other extra-university research organizations (Table 1).2 Likewise, 
the share in universities in Germany was with approximately 11% much smaller. 
Table 1: Fraunhofer key-figures3 
  2005 2010 2014 2015 2016 
Budget (mln. €) 1,252 1,657 2,060 2,115 2,081 
Employees 12,400 18,130 23,786 24,984 24,485 
Project funds (mln. €) 826 1,173 1,272 1,305 1,386 
Budget share industry funds (% ) 40 34 30 29 32 
Budget share public funds (%) 26 38 32 31 34 
Budget share base funds (%) 29 22 22 25 24 
 
Overall, the Fraunhofer society organizes its core research within seven broad clusters presented in 
Table 2, where some institutes belong to more than one cluster. 
  
                                                          
2 It is noteworthy that the share of industry funding declined over time. The reason is, however, more related to 
the fact that the Fraunhofer budget was considerably extended by the government over the last years. In absolute 
terms the industry funds rose but not at the same pace as the overall budget.  
3 Budget shares do not add to 100%, because the total budget includes also project returns from defense, about 
which information is classified. 
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Table 2: Activity areas 
Cluster Member 
institutes 
Research topics 
ICT 16 Digital media, E-business, E-government, ICT technologies, energy and 
sustainability, medicine production, security, financial services, 
automotive 
Life sciences 7 Medical translation research and biomedicine, regenerative medicine, 
healthy food, biotechnology, safety of chemicals 
Light and surfaces 6 Surface technologies, radiation sources, micro and nanotechnology, 
materials, optical measurement 
Microelectronics 11 Smart and healthy living, energy efficient systems, mobility and 
urbanization, industrial automation 
Production 12 Product development, production technologies, production systems, 
production processes, production organization, logistics 
Defence and 
security  
10 Security research, defence and effect, intelligence and surveillance, 
explosives, decision support for the governments and firms, localization 
and communication, image processing 
Materials 16 Health, energy and environment, mobility, construction and living, 
mechanical engineering, microsystems technology, safety 
Innovation 5 Digitalization, Industry 4.0; Mobility, Technology evaluation, Road 
mapping, Scenarios 
Source: Fraunhofer (2017). 
 
2.2 Database construction 
The empirical analysis is based on two main data sources. The first is the project database provided by 
the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, which covers all projects started between 1997 and 2014, excluding 
contracts related to defence and security. The database contains information on the FhG institute and 
department involved, the client, the title, short description and time span of the project, and any 
payments related to the project. In total, the database includes records on 131,158 projects. The detailed 
nature of this unique database provides an exceptional opportunity to open the black box of public 
knowledge dissemination by public research institutes. 
We merged the FhG data to waves of the German contribution to the Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS). The German CIS provides a representative annual sample of German firms with five or more 
employees (See Aschhoff et al. 2013 for further details) and follows the methodology outlined in the 
Oslo Manual (OECD & Eurostat 2005). The present analysis makes use of a panel of the 1996 to 2013 
waves of the German CIS. Excluding firms which were observed less than three times, the German CIS 
covers 198,385 observations on 30,125 firms between 1996 and 2013. Of the 131,158 projects in the 
FhG project database, we were able to match 46,651 projects to 7,781 distinct firms, which were 
surveyed at least once in the CIS survey. Due to nonresponse and the condition of observing a firm at 
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least three times, 32,568 projects, representing 4,495 firms in the CIS panel, were used in the final 
analysis. 
There are several reasons for not matching projects. First, 17% of projects relate to clients outside of 
Germany and, thus, naturally were not part of our sample. Second, any public clients (such as 
universities, research centres, and government institutes) are not covered by the German CIS and hence 
remain unmatched. Third, the German CIS only presents a representative sample of German firms of 
roughly 10% of the population (Aschhoff et al. 2013), which does not capture all firms potentially 
entering contractual relationships with FhG. Fourth, we assigned projects to firms conservatively, 
requiring a match in both name and address. While this avoids errors based on namesakes, it might also 
imply that actual relationships remain unidentified.  
2.3  Interactions with FhG 
This section presents an overview of FhG’s interactions with firms. Figure 1 shows that between 1997 
and 2014 approximately 6,500 projects were started per year. The number of initiated projects was 
especially high in 2009, when about 8,800 projects started. 
 
Figure 1: Projects started by year 
 
The average project in our sample is relatively small-scaled, taking one year and eight months to 
complete and generating approximately € 37,000 in FhG revenue (all amounts refer to € real 2010) 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of project revenue. A sizeable share (26.55%) of projects have no 
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registered revenue. Most firms in the data set collaborate with FhG once (42%), but 31% return for more 
than three projects. 90% of projects involve less than € 100,000 in revenue. 
 
 Figure 2: Distribution of project costs 
Notes: Data have been censored at the 99th percentile (482 €k). The true maximum is higher than 150 
€m. 0.98% of projects report negative revenue, these have been set at 0. 26.55% of projects report no 
revenue. 
 
The data also contains a short description of the project. Table 3 lists the 20 most common keywords in 
the project descriptions, translated from German and harmonized. They show that FhG projects cover 
the full spectrum of applied research, from (feasibility) studies and analysis to development, application, 
and implementation. To gain more insight into the nature of the projects which FhG engages in, we 
differentiated between projects based on the project descriptions into those involving genuine 
technology generation on the one hand and implementation of existing technologies on the other hand. 
The distinguishing feature is that most implementation projects, although potentially providing 
substantial benefits to the firm, are typically quite routine tasks for FhG and thus of limited technological 
complexity. As an example, many FhG institutes grant access to the technical infrastructure by offering 
measurement services. Another example is the installation of specialized machinery. Projects relating to 
technology generation instead involve a higher degree of novelty and technical complexity.  To do this, 
we reviewed all major key-words and assigned them to the implementation class if they indicated a 
change or development. We then cross-checked the resulting classification of projects by reviewing the 
full descriptions to check whether the projects indeed could be interpreted to refer to implementation of 
technology. The final list of key-words includes terms such as ‘adapt’, ‘build’, ‘create’, ‘construct’, 
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‘develop’, ‘improve’, ‘innovate’, ‘integrate’, ‘intervene’, ‘install’, ‘manufacture’, ‘modify’, ‘realize’, 
‘restructure’. One quarter of projects in the FhG database is classified as implementation (24.8%).  
Table 3: Common project keywords 
Rank Term Share  
projects 
Rank Term Share  
Projects 
1 Development 5.27% 11 Creation 1.04% 
2 Analysis 4.08% 12 Feasibility 1.03% 
3 Study 3.33% 13 Process 1.02% 
4 System 1.89% 14 Application 1.00% 
5 Manufacturing 1.35% 15 Technology 0.95% 
6 Supply 1.33% 16 Structure 0.85% 
7 Project 1.31% 17 Concept 0.82% 
8 Optimization 1.29% 18 Simulation 0.81% 
9 Evaluation 1.27% 19 Implementation 0.81% 
10 Test 1.24% 20 Phase 0.79% 
2.4 Variables 
The goal of our analysis is to establish how interaction with FhG affects firm performance and strategy. 
We capture interaction through the amount spent on FhG’s services in each given year (𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖𝑡). About 
3.44% of the firm-years in the panel show positive FhG expenditures, representing 2,181 of the 30,125 
distinct firms included in the sample (7.2%).4 
As firms might benefit in different ways from working with FhG, we consider four outcomes in the 
analysis. First, we analyse performance in terms of turnover (𝑇𝑅) and productivity (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷). Separating 
between productivity and turnover is necessary because firms differ widely in their strategic goals. Some 
may primarily focus on growing fast, while others may focus on increasing their economic efficiency in 
terms of value added per employee. In particular, the latter variable can also be understood as measure 
of innovative achievement, since growth in productivity is typically related to increasing resource 
efficiency following process innovations or higher sales increases resulting from successful product 
innovation. We capture productivity through a measure of value added by worker. 
Second, we analyse to which extent interactions with FhG have a systematic effect on firm’s innovation 
strategy. We consider two aspects. First, a reasonable expectation is that in order to reap the benefits of 
interactions with FhG, firms need to develop a sufficient absorptive capacity. A key mechanism to raise 
                                                          
4 A small minority of projects involves negative payment flows. These are set to 0 for the purposes of this 
analysis. Likewise, approximately one third of projects in the FhG database do not involve payment. These 
might be parts of larger projects (meetings, maintenance contracts, etc.) or small services. Whatever the reason, 
for the purpose of this analysis we are interested in the impact of larger projects which lead to significant 
knowledge flows, and therefore disregard these smaller interactions. Payment data closely tracks the contractual 
start dates of FhG projects: for projects lasting two years or less, payment is typically made in within the first 
year of the project. For the minority of projects which last three years or longer, the average lag between the 
project’s start and payment increases by approximately 4 months per year increase in project duration. We can 
therefore utilize payment data as a close proxy for the timing and duration of FhG projects. 
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the absorptive capacity is to invest in the human capital stock. Consequently, we expect that firms will 
adjust their hiring strategy and increase the share of employees with tertiary education background 
(𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇). Second, we expect that firms engage with FhG as a means to achieving their innovative goals. 
If FhG interactions have a positive effect on the firms' innovative performance, we expect that, in 
particular, the share of turnover achieved through the sales of products or services which have been 
introduced or significantly improved in the last three years (𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆) as a central success measure 
of innovation (compare Robin and Schubert 2013), will increase post interaction. 
The CIS collects information on a wide range of factors that might confound the relation between FhG 
expenditures and firm performance. These include R&D expenditures, as share of turnover (𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇), 
and the size of the firm, as measured through the number of employees (𝐸𝑀𝑃). We include the firm’s 
age (𝐴𝐺𝐸), and whether the firm exports any goods or services to other countries (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇). In 
addition, we control for whether firm is located in former Eastern Germany (𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇), which captures 
broad regional economic differences within Germany still pertinent even after almost 30 years after 
reunification. We further control for the economic activities of the firm through the inclusion of sector 
indicators and include year fixed effects to account for common macroeconomic trends.  
Table A.1 in appendix contain summary statistics and variable definitions. 
2.5 Exploratory analysis 
We start the analysis with an exploratory regression of FhG expenditures on the outcomes, controlling 
for other firm attributes. We employ a simple OLS model in levels with explanatory variables lagged 
one year, and structure the variable of interest, interaction with FhG, in two parts: one variable taking 
value 1 if there were expenditures in the previous year (𝐼[𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1 > 0]), and the natural log of the level 
of FhG expenditures (plus 1;  ln [𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1]). This is particularly interesting as the previous literature has 
typically established the effect of the presence of an interaction, and much less related outcomes to its 
intensity. Our data allows us to contrast these.  
The results are shown in Table 4. The effects differ by outcome: turnover (column 1) does not correlate, 
conditional on other firm attributes, with the presence of FhG expenditures, but the elasticity between 
the level of FhG expenditures and turnover is strong and significant at 0.09 (p<0.01). Productivity 
(column 2), on the other hand, does not correlate with the level of FhG expenditures, but firms with 
some interaction are 8.7% more productive, albeit at a low level of statistical significance (p<0.10). In 
the case of innovative sales (column 3), we find that both matter: firms with some level of FhG 
experience a 2.9% points higher share of sales of new or improved products or services (p<0.05), and a 
semi-elasticity of 1.4% points to the level of FhG expenditures. As for the firms workforce (column 4), 
the initial estimation shows no relation to the presence of FhG expenditures but a semi-elasticity to their 
level of 1.1% points.  
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Table 4: Exploratory analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡) 𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡 
𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1)  0.090*** 0.023 0.014*** 0.011**  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.004) (0.005) 
𝐼(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1 > 0)  0.010 0.087* 0.029** 0.026 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.014) (0.016) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1)  0.886*** 0.047*** -0.011*** 0.006*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1  -0.461*** -0.422*** 0.312*** 0.533***  
 (0.040) (0.071) (0.025) (0.029) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1)  0.034*** 0.019** -0.014*** -0.010***  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑡−1  0.179*** 0.189*** 0.035*** 0.046***  
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003) 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑡−1  0.053*** 0.053*** 0.007* 0.009***  
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.004) (0.002) 
𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1  -0.216*** -0.275*** 0.043*** 0.010***  
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003) 
CONSTANT  -1.486*** 3.589*** 0.315*** -0.018  
 (0.175) (0.166) (0.019) (0.022) 
Industry F.E. 
 joint significance  
 F(25,14788)= 
70.898*** 
F(25,9807)= 
42.081*** 
F(25,13641)= 
147.719*** 
F(25,14962)= 
32.367*** 
Time F.E. 
 joint significance 
 F(16,14788)= 
10.009*** 
F(15,9807)= 
5.608*** 
F(16,13641)= 
17.499*** 
F(16,14962)= 
90.671*** 
N  48268 27279 40784 42364 
R²  0.834 0.229 0.434 0.247 
Notes: OLS regression. Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses. 
* p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Naturally, this regression is only descriptive and subject to the issue of selection bias: FhG expenditures 
are not allocated to firms randomly, but firms rather choose FhG as a cooperation partner when they 
expect to gain from the interaction. At the same time, the selection is typically mutual in the sense that 
FhG institutes will choose more innovative firms too. In the remainder of the analysis, we will make use 
of heteroscedasticity in the selection process as a source of exogenous variation to identify the true 
causal relation between FhG expenditures and firm outcomes. 
 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Identification strategy 
Identification of the key effects of FhG interactions on firm performance through regression techniques 
faces the issue that FhG interactions are not random but rather results from selection. This section 
describes our empirical strategy to deal with the mutual selection issues.  
To fix ideas, consider the following simple model of the relationship between the firm performance yit 
and the cooperation variable 𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖𝑡: 
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yit = xitβ + FHGitδ + uit      (1) 
where xit is a vector of control variables and uit is a structural error term. δ is the central parameter of 
interest and measures how the interaction variable affects firm performance. If the time-varying factors 
governing the selection process can be sufficiently controlled for in xit we can estimate Eq. (1) by regular 
Pooled OLS (POLS) and obtain consistent estimates of δ. If we assumed that any unobserved 
heterogeneity in uit is time-constant we could also use Fixed Effects (FE). Time constant unobserved 
heterogeneity is, however, a problematic assumption, which is quite unlikely to hold. If selection is also 
a function of the firms' innovative capabilities, assuming constant unobserved heterogeneity would 
imply to assume away process of capability or skill accumulation inside the firm. This assumption seems 
particularly unreasonable since our dataset covers a long period, implying that neither FE-regression 
will lead to consistent estimates of δ. 
To prevent that, we need to identify δ from exogenous variation in the interaction with FhG induced by 
instrumental variables. Recently, Lewbel (2012) has demonstrated how scale heteroscedasticity can help 
to generate instrumental variables. Essentially, the method proposed by Lewbel (2012) builds on second 
moment restrictions, not unlike well-known dynamic panel data estimators (Arellano and Bond 1991, 
Arellano and Bover 1995). In fact, though not commonly known, the approach by Lewbel extends a 
literature with a long tradition. Other applications relying on time-dependent heteroscedasticity in 
longitudinal data can be found in King et al. (1994), Sentana and Fiorentini (2001), Rigobon (2003) and 
Rigobon and Sack (2004). Indeed not only time-dependent but also cross-sectional heteroscedasticity 
can lead to structural identification as indicated already by Wright (1928). In order to provide some 
intuition why heteroscedasticity can lead to structural parameter identification, we sketch the general 
idea. We based our presentation on simplified cross-sectional models. We note, however, the Lewbel 
(2012) approach is consistent also in a panel data setting. Assume a simplified model without control 
variables:5  
yi = FHGiδ + a1capabili + e1i, 
     FHGi = a2capabili + e2i.      (2a,b) 
where we allow that e2i is heteroscedastic, i.e. it may depend on some vector ℎ𝑖. Estimating Eq. (2a) by 
OLS without taking the unobserved capability-term into account will result in a biased estimate 𝛿. In 
particular, setting 𝑋 = (FHG1, … , FHGn)
′ , 𝑧 = (capabil1, … , capabiln)
′ and 𝑦 = (y1, … , yn)
′, 𝛿 can be 
written as: 
𝛿 = (𝑋′𝑋)−1𝑋′𝑦 
                                                          
5 Suppressing the control variables leads to a closed form expression of the bias without matrix algebra, but 
otherwise does not inhibit the generality of the illustration.  
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= (1 𝑛⁄ ∑ 𝑥𝑖
′𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
−1 1 𝑛 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
′𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1⁄ = 𝛿 + (1 𝑛⁄ ∑ 𝑥𝑖
′𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
−1 1 𝑛 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
′(𝑎1𝑧𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1⁄ + 𝑒1𝑖) (3) 
The probability limes of Eq. (3) is given by: 
𝛿
𝑝
→= 𝛿 + 𝑎1
𝐸(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖)
𝐸(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖
2)
= 𝛿 + 𝑎1
𝑎2𝐸(𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖
2)
𝑎2
2𝐸(𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖
2)+𝐸(𝑒2𝑖
2 )
 (4) 
where the second equality follows from replacing FHGit with Eq. (2b). Although the OLS estimate is 
generally biased, if 𝐸(𝑒2𝑖𝑡
2 ) is large, the bias will be small. Fisher (1976) calls the dependence of the 
bias on the first stage error variance near identifiability. We present a graphical representation in Figure 
1, where we simulated the Eqs. (2a, b) using δ = 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 1, e1i~ capabili~𝑁(0,1). The left panel is 
generated with e2i~𝑁(0,1
2) and the right panel is generated with e2t~𝑁(0,5
2). Obviously, the true 
parameter δ is 1. However, when running the regression yi on FHGi we obtain a biased estimate of about 
1.5 in the left panel. If we increase the second stage error to variance to 25 (right panel), the estimated 
slope parameter drops to about 1.04 and is already very close to the true parameter. Intuitively, the 
increase in the variance of e2i weakens the strength of the direct relationship between FHGi and the 
omitted variable capabili, which is defined by Eq. (2b), leading to a drop in the bias. 
  
Figure 2: Higher degrees of heteroscedasticity lead to more accurate estimation of FHG 
Two principal ways to exploit the dependence of the bias on the error variance have emerged in the 
literature. The first approach is the event-study design, which assumes that in specific events the error 
variance becomes so large that OLS leads to approximate identification. However, unless the variance 
becomes infinite, identification will never be exact. Under certain conditions it is however possible to 
use heteroscedasticity as a basis for defining instrumental variables, which can solve the identification 
problem even if the second stage error variance is finite. Eq. (4) gives an intuition: since the omitted 
variable bias is a function of the first stage error variance, heteroscedasticity implies that not only 𝐸(𝑒2𝑖
2 ) 
but also the bias in Eq. (4) is a function of the vector ℎ𝑖. If for example we assume positive scale 
-10 -5 0 5 10
-1
0
-5
0
5
1
0
FhG
y
sd(e2)=1
-10 -5 0 5 10
-1
0
-5
0
5
1
0
FhG
y
sd(e2)=5
15 
 
heteroscedasticity, the bias is smaller the larger the individual elements of ℎ𝑖 are. Moreover, since ℎ𝑖 
appears nowhere else in the model, ℎ𝑖 induces exogenous variation in the model: it affects FHGi, more 
precisely its volatility, but it has no effect on capabili or its volatility. Indeed, we can define instruments, 
which use this exogenous information to identify the true regression parameters.  
To illustrate that, we turn to more general version of Eqs. (2a, b) allowing for a vector of control 
variables 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ
𝑘: 
yi = xiβ + 𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖δ+ui 
𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖 = xiζ + vi    (5a,b) 
with uit = a1capabili + e1i, and vi = a2capabili + e2i and 𝐸(𝑒2𝑖
2 ) is allowed to depend on 𝑥𝑖𝑡. Again, 
we are not able to consistently estimate the model because of omitted variable bias induced by the 
unobserved variable capabili. 
To achieve identification by exploiting heteroscedasticity we make the usual minimal identification 
assumption that xi is exogenous, i.e. 𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑢𝑖) = 0  and 𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑣𝑖) = 0 . Lewbel (2012) shows that the 
variable zi defined as zi = (xi − E(xi))vi is a valid instrument for FHGit if the following two conditions 
are met:  
cov(xi − E(xit), uivi) = 0 
          cov(xi − E(xi), 𝑣𝑖
2) ≠ 0     (6a, b) 
Because the proof is lengthy and somewhat tedious, we omit here. Yet, it is easy to create some intuition 
why these assumptions identify the parameters of interest. Eq. (6b), meaning heteroscedastic first stage 
errors, implies that the instrument zi and the endogenous variable are correlated. Using Eq. (5a,b) we 
can write: 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖−E(xi), vi
2) = 𝐸((𝑥𝑖−E(xi))𝑣𝑖(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖 − xiζ)) 
= 𝐸(𝑧𝑖𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖) − ζE(x𝑖
2𝑣𝑖) + ζE(xi)E(xi𝑣𝑖) = E(𝑧𝑖𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖) ≠ 0   (7) 
On the other hand, Eq. (6a) guarantees that xi does not simultaneously affect the variance of the 
unobserved variable. Assuming without loss of generality that the expectation of the unobserved variable 
is zero, note that: 
cov(xi − E(xi), uivi) = 𝐸(𝑧𝑖𝑢𝑖) 
= E((𝑥𝑖−E(xi))(a1a2capabili
2 + a1capabilie2i + a2capabilie1i + e1ie2i)) = 0  (8) 
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Thus, Eq. (6b) is similar to the regular rank condition in IV ensuring that the instruments are correlated 
with the endogenous variable. Eq. (6a) is equivalent to the exogeneity condition, because it requires that 
the instruments and the structural error term are uncorrelated. Furthermore, Eq. (8) illustrates the 
identification assumption: the variation in 𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖 induced by heteroscedastic first stage errors is 
exogenous only if it does not also affect the variance of the unobserved variable capabili, which is a 
standard assumption in error component models (Lewbel 2012). We can easily implement the Lewbel 
estimator by constructing the sample equivalent of zi: 
zî = (xi − x̅)vî (9) 
where vî is the residual from reduced form regression of FHGi on the exogenous regressors xi. vî   is 
structurally identified because the parameters in the reduced form regression can always be consistently 
estimated (Wooldridge, 2002).6 
For the purpose of our paper, the results by Lewbel (2012) imply that we are able to identify the causal 
effect of an interaction with FhG on firm performance, if and only if we detect a source of 
heteroscedasticity in the reduced form regression.  
3.2 First-stage heteroscedasticity 
We will now continue by providing evidence that in particular firm size induces positive scale 
heteroscedasticity, such that the variance of the FhG expenditures is a robust and positive function of 
firm size. The other control variables (e.g. age, exports, etc.) do not show any evidence of inducing 
heteroscedasticity, implying that we cannot fruitfully use them as a basis to identify the causal effect of 
FhG interaction on firm performance. Mathematically, the size variable meets the condition in Eq. (6b) 
while the other controls do not. An important implication is that the identification strategy based on 
heteroscedasticity leads in our application to an exactly (though not over) identified model. 
  
                                                          
6 It should be noted that Lewbel-methodology works in broader settings than the omitted variable bias considered 
here. In specific, even full simultaneity in Eq. (2a) and Eq. (2b) is admissible. 
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Table 5: Regression for instrument calculation 
 (1) 
Dependent:  ln (𝐹ℎ𝐺𝑡−1) 
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 0.629*** 
 (0.091) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1) 0.000 
 (0.007) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1) 0.094*** 
 (0.007) 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑡−1 0.011 
 (0.012) 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑡−1  -0.011 
 (0.010) 
𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1 0.004 
 (0.011) 
CONSTANT -0.282*** 
 (0.042) 
Industry F.E. 
 joint significance  
F(25,17603)= 
10.043*** 
Time F.E. 
 joint significance 
F(16,17603)= 
20.671*** 
N 57301 
R² 0.090 
Notes: OLS regression. Standard errors in 
parentheses.  
Standard errors clustered by firm 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Table 5 presents an OLS regression of FhG expenditures on firm characteristics, representing the first 
stage in Eq. 5. The main observable factors driving FhG expenditures are R&D intensity and size: other 
factors equal, a one percentage point increase in R&D intensity coincides with a 0.63% increase in FhG 
expenditures, and a one percent increase in size leads to a 0.094% increase in expenditures. Likewise, 
the sector and time fixed effects are statistically jointly significant at p<0.01. 
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Figure 3: First stage heteroscedasticity 
Notes: Lowess smoother. Bandwidth = 0.8. 
 
As Figure 3 shows, FhG expenditures exhibit strong scale heteroscedasticity. The presence of 
heteroscedasticity is confirmed by Koenker’s (1981) NR² test statistic (LM(47) = 5470.244, p<0.01) as 
well as White’s (1980) NR² test (LM(652) =2142.160, p<0.01). Both strongly reject homoscedasticity. 
As argued above, this scale heteroscedasticity appears to be solely driven by firm size. We see that 
explicitly in figure 4, where the results of linear partial regressions of the explanatory variables on the 
squared error are shown.7 This result is intuitive: as firm size increases, the variation in R&D budget, 
and hence expected FhG expenditures, increases as well. In the empirical analysis, we make use of the 
scale heteroscedasticity in FhG expenditures driven by firm size in order to instrument FhG 
expenditures and identify a causal relationship between collaboration with FhG and firm outcomes. 
 
  
                                                          
7 Each panel shows the outcome for one regression, where the other covariates are controlled and the variable of 
interest is estimated through a Lowess smoother. The last three panels (Exporter, Group, East German) present 
the outcome of a t-test where the residual of a regression of the squared error on the other covariates is compared 
across the (binary) variable of interest. 
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Figure 4: Linear partial regression of heteroscedasticity in first stage on firm characteristics 
Notes: Y axis: squared residual of regression of FhG expenditures on controls. Line: Lowess 
smoother. Bandwidth = 0.8. 
3.3 Econometric specification 
We make additional changes to the main specification in addition to using heteroscedasticity in FhG 
expenditures to identify their effect. To further eliminate unobserved heterogeneity between firms, we 
use year-on-year growth rates (for turnover and productivity) and differences (workforce education and 
innovative sales) as outcomes, rather than their levels. This correction removes variation due to common 
factors among firm-year combinations from the data (compare Imbens and Wooldridge, 2008). In the 
case of turnover and productivity growth, we can write the baseline model as follows:8 
ln (
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
) = 𝛼 + ln(y𝑖𝑡−1) γ + ln (𝐹ℎ𝐺𝑖𝑡−1)𝛿 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛽 + 𝑇𝑡𝜁 + 𝐼𝑖𝑡−1𝜂 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (7) 
The left hand side of the equation, ln (
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
),  represents the logged growth factor of respectively 
turnover and productivity. Both the outcome and FhG expenditures, ln(𝐹ℎ𝐺𝑖𝑡−1), are estimated in logs. 
                                                          
8 Table A-2 additionally reports results for a level specification estimated with OLS and Fixed Effects. The 
results reported below are robust to the OLS level model, and hold for turnover and productivity in the Fixed 
Effects model. However, as we explain in the methodology, neither model solves the endogeneity issue of 
nonrandom selection into FhG expenditures. 
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Because ln (
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
) ≈ 𝑔𝑦, with 𝑔𝑦 being the growth rate of y, our specification allows us to interpret the 
coefficient of ln(𝐹ℎ𝐺𝑖𝑡−1) as a semi-elasticity on the growth rate. As suggested by Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2008), we include the log of the lagged outcome, ln(y𝑖𝑡−1), in the estimation in order to 
account for any systematic relationship between the average growth rates and the level of the outcome 
variable. We furthermore control for other observable firm characteristics captured in 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1, including 
lagged R&D intensity, firm age and size9, and whether the firm exports, is part of a group, and is situated 
in former Eastern Germany. We also include a set of year and industry dummies to account for generic 
time and sector effects. 
In the case of the share of employees with tertiary education and the share innovative sales, we adapt 
Eq. 7 to take into account the fact that the outcome is a share and hence bounded between 0 and 1. 
Because the outcome already represents shares, using a growth rate would make the results hard to 
interpret intuitively. As a more convenient alternative, we difference the outcome variable, which allows 
us to interpret the coefficient of ln (𝐹ℎ𝐺𝑖𝑡−1) as an effect on the outcome variable in percentage points. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1γ + ln (𝐹ℎ𝐺𝑖𝑡−1)𝛿 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (8) 
We estimate the models with OLS and with 2SLS. In the latter, we instrument ln (𝐹ℎ𝐺𝑖𝑡−1) through 
𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ [ln (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) − ln(𝐸𝑀𝑃)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ], where 𝑣 is the estimated first-stage error term, as described in the 
previous section. In all models, we account for cross-sectional dependence by calculating standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
4 Results 
4.1 Turnover growth and productivity growth 
Table 6 presents OLS and 2SLS estimates of the relation between FhG expenditures, 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1), on 
the right hand side, and turnover and productivity growth factors (ln(𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) and ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) on the 
left-hand side. Column 1 shows the OLS estimates for turnover growth. A one percent increase in a 
firm’s FhG expenditures relates to a large 1.0 percentage point increase in the firms' annual growth rate 
(p<0.01). The 2SLS estimates (column 2) yields a slightly higher effect of 1.1 percentage points. The 
model shows a strong first stage with Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic far exceeding Stock-Yogo critical 
values (Stock & Yogo, 2005). If we compare the latter to the average growth in the sample, which is 
6.7% (Table A-1), the FhG effect is substantial. It amounts to approximately 16% of the total average 
growth in the sample. 
                                                          
9 We omit the latter from the specification focusing on turnover growth, as lagged turnover and number of 
employees are highly correlated (0.89). However, the coefficient of Fraunhofer expenditures does not change 
significantly if this variable is included. 
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With respect to the control variables, the model show the expected relations. Turnover growth rates 
increase in R&D intensity (𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1), and decrease in size (ln [𝑇𝑅𝑡−1]) and age (ln [𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1]). 
Exporting firms (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑡−1) and firms which are part of groups (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑡−1) experience higher 
turnover growth, and firms from former Eastern Germany (𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1) tend to grow more slowly. The 
sector and year dummies are each jointly significant at p<0.01. 10 
Columns 3 and 4 present the result for productivity growth. The results support that engaging with FhG 
increase also the firms' productivity growth, with both the OLS and 2SLS estimates situated around an 
effect at 0.7 percentage points. The IV estimations are however less precise than the OLS estimates 
(OLS: p<0.01, 2SLS: p<0.05). Productivity growth also correlates positively with R&D intensity (albeit 
at weak statistical significance) and the size of the firm (ln [𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1]). Exporting and firms which are 
part of groups also show higher productivity growth. Firms situated in former Eastern Germany instead 
have a lower productivity growth. In addition, productivity growth also drops more quickly at higher 
productivity levels than turnover growth (estimated elasticity of 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡−1 to 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡: -0.155%, 
compared to -0.009% for 𝑇𝑅𝑡−1 and TRGRt). 
  
                                                          
10 The results presented in these columns are robust to including 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1) as additional covariate. We 
however do not include it to avoid issues of multicollinearity. 
22 
 
Table 6: FhG expenditures and firm performance 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1)  0.010*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.007** 
 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑅𝑡−1)  -0.009*** -0.008***   
  (0.001) (0.001)   
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡−1)    -0.155*** -0.155*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1)    0.013*** 0.013*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1  0.154*** 0.151*** 0.055* 0.055* 
 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1)  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.001 -0.001 
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑡−1  0.013*** 0.013*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑡−1  0.014*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1  -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
CONSTANT  0.054* 0.006 0.494*** 0.633*** 
 
 (0.028) (0.013) (0.051) (0.031) 
Industry F.E. 
 joint significance  
 F(25,14836)= 
5.160*** 
Chi²(25)= 
128.781*** 
F(25,9480)= 
13.378*** 
Chi²(25)= 
335.120*** 
Time F.E. 
 joint significance 
 F(16,14836)= 
58.905*** 
Chi²(16)= 
946.268*** 
F(15,9480)= 
11.716*** 
Chi²(15)= 
176.093*** 
N  48268 48268 25468 25468 
R²  0.031 0.031 0.100 0.100 
Cragg-Donald Wald 
 F-statistic 
  49150.140  25552.642 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 2SLS: 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1) 
instrumented through 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ [ln (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) −  ln(𝐸𝑀𝑃)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ], where 𝑣 is the estimated first-stage error 
term. Specifications 1-2: 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1) omitted to avoid multicollinearity with 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑅𝑡−1). The results 
do not change substantially when 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1) is included. 
* p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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4.2 Human capital and innovation success 
We now turn to innovation as a potential driver of the positive effects in terms turnover and productivity 
growth. If interacting with FhG affects firms’ innovation strategy, as we have argued, this may be 
reflected in the firm’s hiring strategy or innovative success. Table 7 presents the impact of FhG 
expenditures on the change in the share of employees with tertiary education (Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1, column 1 
and 2) and on the change in the share of innovative products and services in turnover 
(Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1, column 3 and 4). 
As shown in column 1, the OLS coefficient of 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1) is positive and statistically highly significant 
(p<0.01). A one percent increase in FhG expenditures relates to a 0.3 percentage point increase in the 
share of employees with tertiary education. This supports the intuition that FhG expenditures lead to a 
shift in the firm’s hiring strategy towards the recruitment of more qualified personnel. The effect 
however turns insignificant in the 2SLS specification (column 2), indicating that the observed 
correlation is most likely due to selection. The regressions also show expected negative relations 
between the lagged share of employees with tertiary education (𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡−1), firm age, and size. We find 
stronger increases among exporting firms, more R&D intense firms, and firms in former Eastern 
Germany.  
Columns 3 and 4 present the relation between FhG expenditures and the change in the share of sales due 
to innovative products and services. The OLS and 2SLS estimations indicate that a one percent increase 
in FhG expenditures leads to an increase in the share of innovative sales enjoyed by the firm of 
respectively 0.7 and 0.5 % points. Comparing that increase to the average share of turnover with due to 
new products of 6.7% (Table A-1), we find an economically sizeable effect of 7.5% of the overall 
average. 
  
24 
 
Table 7: FhG expenditures and firm strategy 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
  Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 
𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1)  0.003*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.005** 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡−1  -0.143*** -0.143***   
  (0.004) (0.004)   
𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡−1    -0.425*** -0.424*** 
    (0.008) (0.008) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1)  -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1  0.042*** 0.043*** 0.212*** 0.213*** 
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.017) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1)  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑡−1  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑡−1  0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1  0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CONSTANT  0.005 0.057*** -0.011 -0.002 
 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) 
Industry F.E. 
 joint significance  
 F(25,13258)= 
21.893*** 
Chi2(25)= 
548.819*** 
F(25,12884)= 
13.925*** 
Chi2(25)= 
347.213*** 
Time F.E. 
 joint significance 
 F(16,13258)= 
7.345*** 
Chi2(16)= 
120.670*** 
F(16,12884)= 
39.329*** 
Chi2(16)= 
627.508*** 
N  39019 39019 35019 35019 
R²  0.083 0.081 0.288 0.313 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic   35194.618  32009.447 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 2SLS: 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1) 
instrumented through 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ [ln (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) −  ln(𝐸𝑀𝑃)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ], where 𝑣 is the estimated first-stage error 
term. 
* p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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4.3 Result heterogeneity 
This section presents heterogeneous results along project and firm characteristics. In order to obtain 
results differentiated by type of project and firms, we interact ln(𝐹ℎ𝐺𝑖𝑡−1) with dummies representing 
certain cut-off points (e.g. small in contrast to large firms). 
In terms of project characteristics, we first consider whether the effects differ between projects relating 
to technology implementation or generation. Second, we test whether the effects differ for firms with a 
longer history of FhG interactions. Third, we analyse whether FhG expenditures are subject to 
diminishing returns. On the firm side, we study variation among the effect along R&D intensity, sector 
of operations, size, and age.  
Because IV methods typically become instable when the number of endogenous variables increases, all 
results are based on OLS estimates where the differentiating factor in question is interacted with 
ln (𝐹ℎ𝐺𝑖𝑡−1). We believe that using OLS results is justifiable, since the IV and the OLS-results did not 
differ tremendously in the baseline regressions in Table 6 and Table 7. 
4.3.1 Project characteristics 
Table 8 compares projects aimed at technology implementation and projects focused on technology 
generation. For this we make use of the keyword-based definition outlined in Table 3. We define 
implementation projects as those relating to concrete changes in the firm, such as the installation of new 
equipment, the introduction of a new product, etc. Technology generation relates more to upstream 
activities such as performing scientific studies. Whereas both bring valuable knowledge to the firm, 
generation projects deliver more abstract knowledge which might have a different effect on performance 
and strategy.  
The difference is reflected in the results: only expenditures for technology generation show a strong and 
significant relation to all types of firm-level outcomes, whereas implementation projects only lead to 
increases in productivity growth and innovative sales. Technology generation projects instead also lead 
to higher turnover growth and more personnel with tertiary education. The stronger effect on turnover 
growth and a change towards use of higher qualified personnel indicate that a substantial part of the 
value generated by FhG is in the form of enabling firms to make us of abstract scientific knowledge, 
which might otherwise be unattainable.   
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Table 8: Impact of FhG expenditures by project focus 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 
Technology implementation 0.002 0.010*** 0.002 0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
Technology generation 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Notes: OLS regression. Coefficient represents interaction with 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1). Other controls included. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Table 9 shows how the impact of FhG expenditures evolves along firm’s experiences with FhG, as 
proxied by the number of years in which payments were made to FhG. The dynamics are different for 
the different outcomes. Turnover growth effects do not materialize after the first payment, but later 
payments show positive effects. In other words, an additional FhG -related project interaction – as 
proxied by a payment - consistently relates to increases in growth, even when the firm already interacted 
with FhG in the years before. The estimates concerning productivity growth paint a partially different 
picture: some productivity growth shows after the first FhG payment, but the effect of the second is 
much higher. However, later payments, with the exception of the final group which groups together five 
and more, do not result in additional efficiency gains.  
These patterns are also reflected in the innovation and human capital related outcome measures: 
additional payments to FhG consistently result in gains in the increase in the share of innovative sales, 
but further increases in the share of employees with tertiary education taper off after the 3rd. Our results 
therefore show that interacting with FhG does not lead to immediate positive effects. Instead, firms need 
to engage in multiple projects with FhG before benefits peak, suggesting that firms probably need to 
make adjustments to their processes and their internal capability base in order to reap the full benefits 
of FhG interactions. 
Table 9: Impact of FhG expenditures by interaction number 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 
1st 0.006 0.011* 0.002 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) 
2nd 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.002** 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) 
3rd 0.010** 0.010 0.005** 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) 
4th 0.009* 0.008 0.002 0.012*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) 
5th+  0.010** 0.010*** 0.002* 0.007*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Notes: OLS regression. Coefficient represents interaction with 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1). Other controls included. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Table 10 explores the returns to scale associated with FhG expenditures. To that end, differential effects 
are estimated for each quartile of the distribution of FhG expenditures. Again, the results differ by 
outcome. The smallest volumes of expenditures realize neither turnover growth nor productivity gains. 
Expenditures in the 2nd to 4th quartile do result in turnover growth, but at comparable marginal effects 
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across the level of expenditures. Productivity gains are only realized among firms which show relatively 
high levels of FhG expenditures, that is, in the upper half of the distribution. Growth in the share of 
employees with tertiary education is only found at high levels of statistical significance (p<0.01) for the 
largest category of FhG expenditures. In contrast, increased innovative sales show up significant at most 
ranges. However, the estimated coefficient is highest at the lower end of the FhG expenditures 
distribution. 
Table 10: Impact of FhG expenditures by expenditures level 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 
1st Quartile 0.004 0.013 0.006* 0.019** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.003) (0.008) 
2nd Quartile 0.013*** 0.008 0.00006 0.009** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) 
3rd Quartile 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.002* 0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
4th Quartile 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Notes: OLS regression. Coefficient represents interaction with 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1). 1
st Quartile: up to 6,203 EUR. Second quartile: 
6,204 EUR up to 22,762 EUR. Third quartile: 22,763 EUR up to 72,306 EUR. Fourth quartile: more than 72,306 EUR. 
Other controls included. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Taken as a whole, this exploration of the effects of FhG expenditures along the nature of the project 
shows that projects seem to either result in innovative success and growth, or in efficiency gains. When 
the goal is to increase innovative success and growth, projects focusing on technology generation, 
repeated interactions, and relatively lower levels of expenditures appear to be more effective. Efficiency 
gains are realized when projects are more strongly related to implementation tasks, do not yield 
additional benefits along further interactions, and are comparably large in terms of project volume. 
4.3.2 Firm characteristics 
Table 11 shows the impact of FhG for firms with different R&D intensities. Economic theory predicts 
that firms require certain levels of internal knowledge in order to optimally internalize and apply external 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). It is therefore worthwhile to consider to which extent without 
high R&D expenditures can benefit from FhG’s mission of knowledge transfer.  
Table 11 shows that some level of R&D expenditures is a precondition for internalizing FhG 
expenditures into productivity and innovation, but even firms without any R&D expenditures in a year 
enjoy higher turnover growth in the wake of interacting with FhG. Even though the estimated coefficient 
is statistically only weakly significant, it is similar to the estimates for firms with either below or above 
average R&D intensity. The effect of FhG expenditures on productivity growth is only significant and 
large for firms with R&D expenditures, where both comparatively high and low R&D spenders benefit 
similarly. This is also the case for increases in innovative success. 
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Table 11: Impact of FhG expenditures by R&D intensity 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 
No R&D expenditures  0.010* 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Below average 0.010** 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
Above average  0.011*** 0.013*** 0.001 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Notes: OLS regression. Coefficient represents interaction with 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1). Other controls included. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Another relevant question is how much SMEs benefit from interacting with FhG. Table 12 shows 
differential effects for small firms (with less than 50 employees), medium-sized firms (50-249 
employees), and large firms. Small firms only benefit weakly from interacting with FhG, with just a 
statistically weakly significant increase in the share of employees with tertiary education. This might to 
some extent be the result of a lower number of small firms interacting with FhG, as the point estimates 
are quite comparable to those of medium-sized and large firms.  
Large firms, on the other side, show significant effects across the board. Medium sized firms experience 
no significant growth after interacting with FhG, but do show similar increases in productivity growth 
and innovative sales as large firms. The effect on highly educated personnel is larger for medium-sized 
firms than for large firms.  
Table 12: Impact of FhG expenditures by firm size 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 
Small (< 50 empl.) 
0.010 0.007 0.004* 0.006 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) 
Medium (50-249 empl.) 
0.004 0.017*** 0.005*** 0.008** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
Large (≥ 250 empl.)  
0.012*** 0.012*** 0.001** 0.008*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Notes: OLS regression. Coefficient represents interaction with 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1). Other controls included. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Interacting with FhG might also have a different impact on incumbent firms and start-ups. Start-ups are 
especially interesting, as they might be in higher need of short-term knowledge support to develop 
production and innovation lines, but at the same time likely have fewer resources with which to fund 
external research expenses such as FhG. They also might especially benefit from knowledge transfer 
early on, when they are better able to react to opportunities brought by it.  
To assess this possibility, table 13 compares effects of FhG expenditures on young firms, which are 
seven years old or younger, and older firms. The results show that young firms seem to benefit more 
from FhG expenditures in terms if firm growth and increases in the share of innovative sales (even 
though the difference is smaller in this case). Both groups show equal elasticities between FhG 
expenditures and productivity growth. Only older firms seem to see shifts in the share of employees 
with tertiary education as a result of FhG expenditures.  
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Table 13: Impact of FhG expenditures by firm age 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 
≤ 7 years  0.022*** 0.013** 0.002 0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
> 7 years 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Notes: OLS regression. Coefficient represents interaction with 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1). Other controls included. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Table 14 differentiates between firms in manufacturing and service sectors. It is ex ante unclear whether 
service firms also benefit from interacting with FhG to the same degree as firms in manufacturing sectors 
considering that the technologies FhG focuses on are to large extent situated in manufacturing industries. 
The results show that firms in both sectors show increases in performance, human capital composition, 
and innovation success in the wake of FhG expenditures, albeit in slightly different ways. The coefficient 
of FhG expenditures in turnover growth is only statistically significant for manufacturing firms. Service 
firms, however, seem to benefit slightly more in terms of productivity, and in terms of increases in the 
share of innovative sales. Both groups show similar effects of FhG expenditures on the share of 
employees with tertiary education.  
Table 14: Impact of FhG expenditures by manufacturing versus services firms 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 
Manufacturing 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Services 0.007 0.017** 0.004*** 0.011*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) 
Notes: OLS regression. Coefficient represents interaction with 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1). Other controls included. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
The above analysis sheds more light on which firms are best suited to profit from knowledge translation 
in the form of interactions with FhG. Some level of R&D expenditures, i.e. absorptive capacity, on the 
firm’s side seems essential for the translation of FhG expenditures in gains. Furthermore, the smallest 
firms only seem to benefit from FhG to a limited extent; medium-sized and larger firms show much 
stronger benefits. Firm age matters too: young firms show much higher increases in growth as a result 
of FhG expenditures than older firms. Lastly, the main beneficiaries of FhG interactions in terms of 
turnover growth seem to be manufacturing, as opposed to services, firms. At the same time, firms in 
service industries still benefit in terms of productivity growth, changes in the labour force, and 
innovation success. 
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4.4 Robustness check: controlling for other science cooperation 
A potential limitation of our approach is that we did not control for the full range of cooperation 
involving the firm. If interaction with FhG is correlated with cooperation with other research institutions 
or universities, and if both are subject to similar selection processes, the results we documented until 
now might be contaminated by unobserved cooperation. 
While we cannot formally control for all other potential cooperation, some waves of the German CIS 
register which innovation-active firms cooperate with higher education institutes (𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑈𝑁𝐼) and other 
public research institutions (𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇). Hence, we can test whether our results are robust to 
controlling for cooperation for this subsample and the years 2002-2004 and 2006-2013. There are two 
limitations to this approach: the estimations samples are markedly smaller, and the selection of 
innovation-active firms might introduce further distortions. Nevertheless, we can take these results are 
at least indicative. 
These data confirm that interacting with FhG indeed correlates with cooperation with universities 
(correlation coefficient: 0.26) and research institutions (correlation coefficient: 0.29). Table 15 shows 
the results while controlling for 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑈𝑁𝐼 and 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇. Even though 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑡−1 correlates 
positively with 𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡, the elasticity to 𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1 remains robust at 0.012 in the 2SLS specification. The 
relation to 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅 becomes weaker (0.004 instead of 0.007) and turns insignificant. This is also the 
case for Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆, even though the estimated coefficient is much closer to the previous one (0.004 
instead of 0.005). 
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Table 15: Controlling for other science cooperation 
Panel A: firm performance  OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1)  0.005* 0.012*** 0.007* 0.004 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑡−1  0.021*** 0.020*** 0.012 0.012 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑡−1  0.010 0.006 0.014 0.016 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Controls  YES YES YES YES 
N  13498 13410 9272 9272 
R²  0.038 0.039 0.111 0.111 
Cragg-Donald Wald 
F-statistic 
 
 6887.613  4164.942 
      
Panel B: Innovation  OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
  Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 
𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1)  0.002** -0.001 0.002 0.004 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑡−1  0.011*** 0.012*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑡−1  0.007* 0.008** 0.017*** 0.016** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Controls  YES YES YES YES 
N  11789 11789 11866 11866 
R²  0.089 0.089 0.253 0.253 
Cragg-Donald Wald 
F-statistic 
 
 5470.869  5740.132 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 2SLS: 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1) 
instrumented through 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ [ln (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) −  ln(𝐸𝑀𝑃)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ], where 𝑣 is the estimated first-stage error 
term. ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡): 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1) omitted to avoid multicollinearity with 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑅𝑡−1). The results do not 
change substantially when 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1) is included. Cooperation data is available for 2002-2004 and, 
2006-2013. Sample only includes innovation active firms, for which cooperation variables are 
observed. Full results reported in Table A-3.  
* p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
4.5 Placebo tests and dynamics in the performance relationship 
As a way of testing the validity of our approach to identification, we conducted the following logic. If 
our specification is correctly specified, a future increase in FhG expenditures, at, say, 𝑡 + 3, should not 
show a causal relationship with past firm outcomes. A regression of 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡+3) on outcomes should 
therefore yield an insignificant coefficient. As this experiment could be understood as a general test of 
misspecification, a significant coefficient would mean that at least one of the model assumptions fails. 
Such failures could include endogenous IVs, functional form misspecification or non-accounted sources 
of endogeneity. A further source of failure, which could be particularly relevant in this case, is 
autocorrelation in FhG expenditures due to persistence in interacting with FhG over time. This 
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mechanism may give rise to dynamic interdependence, leading to failure of the placebo test operating 
on a static model.  
Panel A of Table 16 shows the results of this specification (the full results are shown in Table A-4). In 
all specifications but the one estimating turnover growth, lead FhG expenditures are not statistically 
significant. We suspect that the significant coefficient for turnover growth is driven by unaccounted 
serial correlation in engagement with FhG. That means that the positive coefficient of 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡+3) 
might represent a residual effect, where FhG expenditures in period 𝑡 − 1 correlate positively with FhG 
expenditures afterwards. To check our suspicion, we re-estimated these models with lagged FhG 
expenditures term in the first stage (Panel B). The positive coefficient of turnover growth indeed 
vanishes when this correlation is accounted for.  
Table 16: Placebo test 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1 
Panel A: Placebo test 
𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡+3)  0.007** 0.005 0.004 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
Controls  YES YES YES YES 
N  22395 14113 14485 19494 
R²  0.041 0.093 0.260 0.078 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic  25400.589 17871.980 15329.832 19951.995 
 
Panel B: Placebo test with dynamic first stage 
𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡+3)  0.006 0.004 0.0004 0.003** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) 
Controls  YES YES YES YES 
N  20357 12970 13405 17843 
R²  0.041 0.094 0.258 0.080 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic  6398.739 4237.055 3958.610 5164.762 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses. Panel B: include 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1) in first stage. 
Full results reported in Table A-4.  
* p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
As a dynamic specification of the first stage seems to correct for at least one kind of misspecification, 
we re-estimate the main results instrumenting 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1) through the scale heteroscedasticity 
instruments generated by firm size and the dynamic term. This yields the additional advantage that we 
can conduct a Hansen J-test for validity of the models over-identifying restrictions. Table 17 reports the 
results (the full regression tables are reported in Table A-5 in appendix). As the sample composition 
changes with the inclusion of a lag in the first term, we report again the OLS results. The first column 
of Panel A reports the regression used to calculate the instruments. The dynamic term, ln (𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−2), is 
indeed significant with an elasticity of 0.752 (p<0.01).  
The remaining results in Panel A and B depict the outcome of the resulting estimations. Note that in all 
specifications, both instruments are strong as indicted by the first stage t-statistics, and the Hansen J-
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statistic does not reject the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. Compared to 
the results generated by a static first stage, the results are stronger in a dynamic specification, with a 
semi-elasticity of turnover growth (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) to FhG expenditures of 1.3 % points (p<0.01; compared to 
1.1 in the static model) and that of productivity growth (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) of 0.8 % points (p<0.05; compared 
to 0.7). The results concerning the qualification of the workforce (Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1) and the sale of new and 
improved products and services Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 turn insignificant in this specification, further 
confirming that their correlation with FhG expenditures is driven by selection bias. 
Table 17: 2SLS with dynamic first stage 
Panel A: Instrument calc.  
And firm performance 
 OLS 
Instrument 
calculation 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
  ln (𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1) ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) 
ln (𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−2)  0.752***     
  (0.014)     
𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1)   0.010*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.008** 
   (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES 
N  51878 43848 43848 23949 23949 
R²  0.572 0.033 0.033 0.100 0.100 
Cragg-Donald Wald 
F-statistic 
   11129.816  5884.586 
Hansen J Statistic 
(p-value) 
   
Chi²(1)=0.000 
(0.986) 
 
Chi²(1)=0.085 
(0.771) 
First stage t-statistic of 𝑧𝑒𝑚𝑝    21.224  16.163 
First stage t-statistic of 𝑧𝑓ℎ𝑔𝑡−2    8.072  6.503 
       
Panel B: Innovation   OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
   Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 
𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1)   0.003*** 0.001 0.0006*** 0.003 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Controls   YES YES YES YES 
N   36076 36076 33679 33679 
R²   0.081 0.081 0.287 0.287 
Cragg-Donald Wald 
F-statistic 
   8355.850  7342.186 
Hansen J Statistic 
(p-value) 
   
Chi²(1)=1.066 
(0.302) 
 
Chi²(1)=0.164 
(0.686) 
First stage t-statistic of 𝑧𝑒𝑚𝑝    17.814  14.852 
First stage t-statistic of 𝑧𝑓ℎ𝑔𝑡−2    6.798  6.169 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 2SLS: 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1) instrumented 
through 𝑧𝑒𝑚𝑝 = ?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ [ln (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) −  ln(𝐸𝑀𝑃)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ] and 𝑧𝑓ℎ𝑔𝑡−2 = ?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ [ln (𝐹ℎ𝐺𝑖,𝑡−2) −  ln
(𝐹ℎ𝐺)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅], where 
?̂? is the estimated first-stage error term. ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡): 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1) omitted to avoid multicollinearity with 
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑅𝑡−1). The results do not change substantially when 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1) is included. Full results reported in 
Table A-5. 
* p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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4.6 Further analysis 
4.6.1 Long-term effects 
Up to now, the analysis has focused on estimating the immediate effect of interacting with FhG. While 
valuable for establishing a causal effect, this approach does not quantify long-term effects, which result 
from the fact that Fraunhofer expenditures are serially correlated. To quantify long-term effects, we 
simulate the impact of an exogenous shock in FhG expenditures on firm growth and innovativeness 
using the IV regression models presented in Table 17 as input. We allow FhG expenditures to serially 
correlate along the model estimated in Panel A of Table 17.  
We then apply the following procedure. In period one, growth, productivity, and innovativeness are set 
to the sample median and FhG expenditures are equal to the median expenditures level of firms with 
FhG expenditures (€ 22,762). From period 2 onwards, FhG expenditures are predicted using the 
coefficient of the dynamic model. Then, the expected level of growth and innovativeness is predicted 
for each period, taking as input the 2SLS regression coefficients in Table 17. Note that we abstract from 
any dynamic between growth and level of the outcomes, in order to show the full effect persistence of 
FhG expenditures.  
Figure 5 plots the resulting evolution in FhG expenditures and outcomes. The initial level of FhG 
expenditures generates a long chain of expenditures, cumulating to € 60,917 after 15 years. The long 
residual in FhG expenditures drives long-lasting growth in the outcomes. The different in short-term 
and long-term effects is indeed significant. After 15 years, firms gain € 750,000 in turnover, an increase 
of 18% compared to the sample median. Value added per employee increases by € 6,639 per employee 
(10%). As a point of reference we also plot the effects on the share of turnover with new products and 
share of employees with tertiary education. These variables were however not significant in the 2SLS 
regressions, implying that we refrain from interpreting the results. This descriptive analysis therefore 
hints that the immediate effects of FhG documented above form only a small part of the total, long-term, 
impact.  
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Figure 5: Long-term impacts 
4.6.2 Macroeconomic productivity effects 
In this section, we intend to estimate the long-term dynamic productivity effect of a hypothetical 
doubling of FhG revenue coming from industry funds on the German economy. To this end, we 
extrapolate the dynamic results in Section 4.5 to the German economy represented by the CIS. We 
assume that additional revenues come exclusively from firms that initially did not cooperate and now 
start one project with a median volume of 22,762€.  
We assume that there are two periods, 0 and 1, and three types firms. In period 0, the baseline period, 
non-cooperating firms (𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐) do not cooperate with FhG. Cooperating (𝑐) firms already cooperate with 
FhG in period 0. In period 1, there are a number of firms that initially did not cooperate with FhG in 
period 0, but start cooperating as a response to the presumed increase in FhG budgets as outline above 
(𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑐). We assume further that productivities may differ between groups but not over time. Thus, all 
changes in productivity occur because some initially non-cooperating firms become co-operators in 
period 1. In each period, the total productivity can thus be written as the weighted average of the 
productivities of group 𝑖 weighted by the respective employment shares of the groups: 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡 = ∑ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑖∈𝐼 ,      𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝐼 = {𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐, 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑐, 𝑐} 
𝑤𝑗𝑡 =
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑛𝑗𝑡
∑ 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖∈𝐼
 (9) 
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where 𝑤𝑗 are the employment shares and 𝑛𝑗𝑡 is the number of firms in group j. Note that 𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑐,0 = 0 
by assumption. Thus, because productivities do not change over time, we can write the productivity 
change induced by some initial non-co-operators becoming new co-operators as follows: 
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑤𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐,1 − 𝑤𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐,0) + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑐,1  (10) 
All terms in Eq. (10) can be estimated either from the sample or from the assumptions about the 
hypothetical increase in industry revenues. The 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  terms are sample averages. The 
number of firms not cooperating with FhG can be calculated as 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐,0 = (1 − 𝑝𝑐)𝑝𝑜𝑝, where 𝑝𝑜𝑝 is 
the population size, i.e. the number of firms in the population covered by the CIS. 𝑝𝑐  is the relative 
frequency of firms cooperating with FhG. It follows that 𝑛𝑐,0 = 𝑝𝑜𝑝 − 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐,0.  
We assume that all co-operators in period 0 remain active in period 1 (𝑛𝑐,1 = 𝑛𝑐,0). As FhG revenue 
increases in period 1, we will have 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤,1 new cooperators in period 1 that were in 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐,0 in period 0. 
If these funds result from each firm having one median project, we have 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑤,1 = Δ𝑟𝑒𝑣 𝑚𝑝𝑠⁄ , where 
Δ𝑟𝑒𝑣 is the increase in revenue and 𝑚𝑝𝑠 is the median project size. We summarize all statistics and the 
resulting calculation of Eq. (9) in Table 18. 
Table 18: Macroeconomic productivity effects 
Parameter Value 
𝑝𝑐 3.44%  
Δ𝑟𝑒𝑣 € 680,000,000.00  
𝑝𝑜𝑝 277,296  
𝑚𝑝𝑠 € 22,762.00   
  
Group 𝑐 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐 𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑐 
 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  4,415    392    392    
𝑛𝑗0 9,537    267,759    0  
𝑛𝑗1 9,537    237,885    29,874    
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  € 114,091.50  € 90,095.01 € 96,734.55  
𝑤𝑗0 28.63% 71.37%   
𝑤𝑗1 28.63% 63.41% 7.96% 
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 € 528.68 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑0 € 96,965.70 
% increase 0.55%  
 
Thus, under the assumption that FhG doubles its revenues from industry, the employment share of non-
co-operators would decrease from 71% to 63%. This reduction in employment share corresponds to an 
increase in employment share of new co-operators of 8%. New co-operators enjoy the long-term 
productivity gain from cooperating with FhG, which we estimated as €6,639.54 after 15-years. The total 
estimated increase in productivity in the German economy is € 528.68 or 0.55% when put in relative 
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terms. Compared to a moderate increase in FhG industry revenues in absolute terms (€ 0.68 bn.) this 
appears to be a highly relevant and quite substantial increase in overall productivity.  
5  Conclusion 
This study presents empirical evidence on the effect of the world’s largest applied research institute, the 
Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, on the performance of collaborating firms. To implement our study, we 
compiled a unique panel dataset of German firms covering the period 1997-2013, based on the German 
contribution to the Community Innovation Survey, to which we matched micro-data on all of FhG’s 
contracts with firms starting 1997. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first make use of such 
data to analyse the impact of applied research organizations. 
To overcome selection effects, we based our identification strategy on methods deriving instruments 
from scale heteroscedasticity. Our results indicate a strong causal effect of contracting with FhG on 
turnover and productivity growth. Furthermore, the impact of FhG seems to be heterogeneous in 
characteristics of the participating firm as well as the project. Whereas the smallest firms only seem to 
benefit from FhG to a limited extent, young firms profit more from contracting with FhG than older 
firms. Manufacturing firms and firms in services industries benefit alike, but in different ways. 
Concerning project characteristics, our analysis distinguishes between projects resulting in innovative 
success and turnover growth, and projects resulting in efficiency gains. Whereas the former relates to 
smaller projects, focusing on the creation of new technology, and repeated interactions, the latter is 
realized through comparatively large projects focused on implementation of technologies, which do not 
yield additional benefits from further repeated interactions.  
Our study makes an important contribution to understanding an understudied aspect of innovation 
policy. Investment in applied research organizations, alongside and complimentary to other pillars such 
as R&D subsidies, tax credits, and investment in public science, seems to be an effective way for policy 
to ease the absorption of scientific knowledge by firms, overcoming frictions due to its basic nature and 
thereby enhancing the impact of public research. Even though several countries, among which Germany, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands follow this strategy, empirical evidence is as of yet scarce. In that sense, 
our results hint that building applied research organizations could be a promising aspect of innovation 
policy, which has up to now been underutilized. This is further highlighted when we calculate the 
macroeconomic impact of FhG, which suggests that the return to public and private investment in FhG 
is of a comparable size to the estimated return to R&D subsidies. 
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7 Appendix 
Table A-1: Summary statistics 
Variable Name Description Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Interaction with Fraunhofer      
𝐹𝐻𝐺 Fraunhofer 
expenditures 
Total amount paid to FhG in year (tho. €) 
198,385 3.355 55.112 0 5,084 
Outcomes      
𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅  Turnover growth
a Year over year growth rate of turnover. 93,643 1.067 0.355 0.337 3.300 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅  Productivity 
growtha  
Year over year growth rate of value added per 
employee 
40,164 1.066 0.394 0.308 3.312 
𝛥𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇 Change in human 
capitalb 
Year over year difference in share of workforce with 
tertiary education 
62,716 0.00231 0.088 -0.500 0.500 
𝛥𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 Change in 
innovative salesb 
Year over year difference in share of turnover 
stemming from innovative products and services 
57,940 -0.00540 0.124 -0.500 0.500 
Controls      
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇 R&D Intensityc € of R&D expenditures per € turnover  77,974 0.025 0.099 0 1 
𝐴𝐺𝐸 Age Years since founding  190,804 29.083 32.268 0 213 
𝐸𝑀𝑃 Employees Number of employees 191,065 531.557 7,253.710 0.500 900,000 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇 Group 1 if firm is member of a group of firms 198,385 0.536 0.499 0 1 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 Exporter 1 if firm indicates to export in year 198,385 0.266 0.442 0 1 
𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇 East-German 1 if firm is located in former Eastern Germany 198,385 0.332 0.471 0 1 
𝑇𝑅 Turnovera Turnover (mio. €) 131,822 213.527 3941.377 1.001 508623.5 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷 Productivitya Added value per employee (tho. €) 61,952 90.970 95.650 8.285 681.844 
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇 Human capital Share of workforce with tertiary education 99,873 0.206 0.255 0 1 
𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 Innovative sales Share of turnover stemming from products and 
services which were introduced or significantly 
improved within the last three years 
112,029 0.067 0.172 0 1 
a: Winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. b:Censored at -0.500 and 0.500 c: Censored at 1. Growth rates are calculated as 
𝑋𝑡
𝑋𝑡−1
⁄ , where 𝑋 is the 
variable of interest. Amounts are GDP deflated and reflect real 2010 €. 
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Table A-2: Robustness check: level and fixed effects models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡) 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡 𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 
  OLS Firm FE OLS Firm FE OLS Firm FE OLS Firm FE 
𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺
𝑡−1
)  0.093*** 0.019*** 0.045*** 0.008* 0.021*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.003 
  (0.008) (0.04) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃
𝑡−1
)  0.886*** 0.402*** -0.047*** -0.040** -0.011*** -0.021*** 0.006*** -0.001 
  (0.005) (0.024) (0.005) (0.020) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) 
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1  -0.461*** -0.124*** -0.420*** -0.130* 0.312*** 0.018 0.533*** 0.052 
  (0.039) (0.046) (0.071) (0.067) (0.025) (0.016) (0.029) (0.032) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸
𝑡−1
)  0.034*** 0.046** 0.019** -0.011 -0.014*** -0.011** -0.010*** -0.020*** 
  (0.008) (0.021) (0.008) (0.026) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑡−1  0.180*** 0.022** 0.190*** -0.001 0.036*** -0.003 0.046*** 0.006 
  (0.0144) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑡−1  0.053***  0.053***  0.007*  0.009***  
  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.004)  (0.002)  
𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1  -0.216***  -0.275***  0.043***  0.010***  
  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.004)  (0.003)  
CONSTANT  -1.487*** 0.359** 3.588*** 4.300*** 0.315***  -0.018 0.120*** 
  (0.175) (0.140) (0.166) (0.131) (0.019)  (0.022) (0.034) 
Industry F.E. 
 joint significance  
 F(25,14788)= 
70.907*** 
F(25,14788)= 
1.629** 
F(25,9807)= 
42.097*** 
F(25,9807)= 
1.613** 
F(25,13641)= 
147.796*** 
F(25,13641)= 
1.511** 
F(25,14962)= 
32.525*** 
F(25,14962)= 
1.654** 
Time F.E. 
 joint significance 
 F(16,14788)= 
10.006*** 
F(16,14788)= 
21.148*** 
F(15,9807)= 
5.628*** 
F(15,9807)= 
8.221*** 
F(16,13641)= 
17.630*** 
F(16,13641)= 
8.298*** 
F(16,14962)= 
90.731*** 
F(16,14962)= 
27.302*** 
N  48268 48268 27279 27279 40784 40784 42364 42364 
R²  0.834 0.163 0.229 0.013 0.434 0.015 0.247 0.021 
Notes: Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. * p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A-3: Full version of Table 9: Controlling for other science cooperation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡) 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡 𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 
  OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1)  0.005* 0.012*** 0.007* 0.004 0.002** -0.001 0.002 0.004 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑅𝑡−1)  -0.008*** -0.009***       
  (0.002) (0.002)       
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡−1)    -0.162*** -0.162***     
    (0.007) (0.007)     
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡−1      -0.158*** -0.157***   
      (0.008) (0.008)   
𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡−1        -0.394*** -0.395*** 
        (0.015) (0.015) 
𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑡−1  0.021*** 0.020*** 0.012 0.012 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑡−1  0.010 0.006 0.014 0.016 0.007* 0.008** 0.017*** 0.016** 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1)    0.013*** 0.014*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001 0.001 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1  0.068** 0.067* 0.016 0.016 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.043) (0.043) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.023) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1)  -0.005 -0.005* 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003** -0.004*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑡−1  0.007 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.014*** 0.014*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑡−1  0.008* 0.008* 0.014* 0.014* -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.003* 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1  -0.007 -0.006 -0.042*** -0.042*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.003 0.003 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CONSTANT  0.005 -0.025 0.653*** 0.607*** 0.040*** 0.055*** 0.017 -0.002 
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.052) (0.051) (0.009) (0.012) (0.026) (0.008) 
Industry F.E. 
 joint significance  
 F(25,6035) 
=2.391*** 
Chi2(25)= 
65.081*** 
F(25,4515)= 
6.407*** 
Chi2(25)= 
160.614*** 
F(25,5568)= 
6.816*** 
Chi2(25)= 
170.169*** 
F(25,5274)= 
4.447*** 
Chi2(25)= 
110.104*** Time F.E. 
 joint significance 
 F(8,6035)= 
38.003*** 
Chi2(8)= 
312.856*** 
F(7,4515)= 
12.739*** 
Chi2(7)= 
89.553*** 
F( ,5568)= 
3.303*** 
Chi2(8)= 
26.239*** 
F(8,5274)= 
22.404*** 
Chi2(8)= 
179.873*** N  13498 13410 9 72 9272 11789 11789 11866 1866 
R²  0.038 0.039 0.111 0.111 0.089 0.089 0.253 0.253 
Cragg-Donald Wald 
 F-statistic 
  6887.613  4164.942  5470.869  5740.132 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 2SLS: 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1) instrumented through 𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ [ln (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) − ln(𝐸𝑀𝑃)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ], where 𝑣 is the estimated first-stage error term. Collaboration data is 
available for 2002-2004 and, 2006-2013. Sample only includes innovation active firms, for which cooperation variables are observed.  
* p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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TableA-4: Full version of Table 9: Placebo test 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Placebo Test (OLS)  2SLS with dynamic first stage 
  ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1  ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1 
𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡+3)  0.007** 0.005 0.004 0.001  0.006 0.004 0.0004 0.003** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) 
ln(𝑇𝑅𝑡−1)  -0.007***     -0.007***    
  (0.001)     (0.001)    
ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡−1)   -0.147***     -0.149***   
   (0.006)     (0.006)   
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡−1    -0.400***     -0.395***  
    (0.011)     (0.011)  
𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡−1     -0.133***     -0.137*** 
     (0.006)     (0.006) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1)   0.012*** 0.004*** -0.001**   0.012*** 0.004*** -0.001*** 
   (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)   (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1  0.153*** 0.028 0.232*** 0.036***  0.144*** 0.017 0.230*** 0.037*** 
  (0.030) (0.036) (0.021) (0.009)  (0.032) (0.037) (0.022) (0.009) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1)  -0.013*** -0.002 -0.003*** -0.001  -0.014*** -0.004 -0.003*** -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑡−1  0.012*** 0.033*** 0.021*** 0.001  0.016*** 0.037*** 0.020*** 0.001 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑡−1  0.013*** 0.005 0.004* -0.000  0.014*** 0.002 0.005** 0.000 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) 
𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1  -0.014*** -0.042*** 0.005** 0.007***  -0.014*** -0.043*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) 
CONSTANT  0.091*** 0.687*** 0.033*** 0.040***  0.100*** 0.705*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 
  (0.024) (0.044) (0.010) (0.008)  (0.026) (0.047) (0.011) (0.008) 
Industry F.E. 
 joint significance  
 Chi²(25)= 
88.180*** 
Chi2(25)= 
188.857*** 
Chi2(25)= 
224.814*** 
Chi2(25)= 
244.355*** 
 Chi2(25)= 
76.561*** 
Chi2(25)= 
176.190*** 
Chi2(25)= 
204.080*** 
Chi2(25)= 
233.665*** 
Time F.E. 
 joint significance 
 Chi2(13)= 
597.761*** 
Chi2(13)= 
98.780*** 
Chi2(13)= 
426.345*** 
Chi2(13)= 
70.420*** 
 Chi2(13)= 
566.229*** 
Chi2(13)= 
92.148*** 
Chi2(13)= 
387.377*** 
Chi2(13)= 
69.440*** 
N  22395 14113 14485 19494  20357 12970 13405 17843 
R²  0.041 0.093 0.260 0.078  0.041 0.094 0.258 0.080 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic  25400.589 17871.980 15329.832 19951.995  6398.739 4237.055 3958.610 5164.762 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses. Dynamic 2SLS: include 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1) in first stage.* p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A-5: Full version of Table 10: 2SLS with dynamic first stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 2SLS 
First Stage 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
  ln (𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1) ln (𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑅𝑡) ln (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑡) Δ𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡,𝑡−1 Δ𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 
ln (𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−2)  0.752***         
  (0.014)         
𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑡−1)   0.010*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.003*** 0.001 0.0006*** 0.003 
   (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑅𝑡−1)   -0.008*** -0.008***       
   (0.001) (0.001)       
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑡−1)     -0.154*** -0.154***     
     (0.005) (0.005)     
𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1)     0.012*** 0.012***     
     (0.002) (0.002)     
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑡−1       -0.143*** -0.142***   
       (0.005) (0.005)   
𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡−1         -0.425*** -0.424*** 
         (0.008) (0.008) 
𝑅𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1  0.174*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.053* 0.053* -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (0.040) (0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1)  -0.003 -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.001 0.001 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.210*** 0.212*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.017) 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑡−1  0.030*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.028*** 0.028*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑡−1  0.007 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1  -0.002* -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.005*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CONSTANT  0.001 0.059** 0.008 0.657*** 0.620*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
  (0.004) (0.028) (0.013) (0.034) (0.032) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry F.E. 
 joint significance  
 
F(25,16436)= 
6.979*** 
F(25,13864)= 
4.992*** 
Chi²(25)= 
123.948*** 
F(25, 9166)= 
12.797*** 
Chi²(25)= 
320.540*** 
F(25,12657)= 
20.250*** 
Chi²(25)= 
507.929*** 
F(25,12452)= 
13.828*** 
Chi²(25)= 
347.064*** 
Time F.E. 
 joint significance 
 
F(15,16436)= 
2.960*** 
F(15,13864)= 
61.960*** 
Chi²(15)= 
930.890*** 
F(14,9166)= 
12.436*** 
Chi²(14)= 
174.411*** 
F(15,12657)= 
6.934*** 
Chi²(15)= 
106.105*** 
F(15, 12452)= 
40.946*** 
Chi²(15)= 
614.439*** 
N  51878 43848 43848 23949 23949 36076 36076 33679 33679 
R²  0.572 0.033 0.033 0.100 0.100 0.081 0.081 0.287 0.287 
Cragg-Donald Wald 
F-statistic 
   11129.816  5884.586  8355.850  7342.186 
Hansen J Statistic 
(p-value) 
   
Chi²(1)=0.000 
(0.986) 
 
Chi²(1)=0.085 
(0.771) 
 
Chi²(1)=1.066 
(0.302) 
 
Chi²(1)=0.164 
(0.686) 
First stage t-statistic of 𝑧𝑒𝑚𝑝    21.224  16.163  17.814  14.852 
First stage t-statistic of 𝑧𝑓ℎ𝑔𝑡−2
    8.072  6.503  6.798  6.169 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 2SLS: 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝐻𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1) instrumented through 𝑧𝑒𝑚𝑝 = ?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ [ln (𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) −  ln(𝐸𝑀𝑃)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ] and 𝑧𝑓ℎ𝑔𝑡−2
= ?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ [ln (𝐹ℎ𝐺𝑖,𝑡−2) −  ln(𝐹ℎ𝐺)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅], where ?̂? is the estimated first-stage 
error term. Specifications 1-2: 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1) omitted to avoid multicollinearity with 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑅𝑡−1). The results do not change substantially when 𝑙𝑛(𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡−1) is included. 
* p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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